Street-children and the Inter-American Development Bank: Lessons from Brazil

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1. OVERVIEW

1.1 Background

Since the early 1990s, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) has been devoting substantial resources to programs concerning the inappropriate presence of destitute children in urban streets "street-children". The surge of street-children in many Latin American and Caribbean cities in the wake of the economic crisis of the 1980s sparked a sense of urgency. The IDB's immediate response was a series of 8 Technical Cooperation operations (TCs), later designated the "Experimental program for minors in especially difficult circumstances" (**Annex A**). They vary greatly in their target populations and specific objectives, but generally: i) had the street-children problem as a major impulse; ii) favor remedial interventions that aim to remove kids from the streets quickly rather than slower preventive measures to reduce the flow of children to the streets; iii) were prepared and approved very quickly with modest resources;[2] iv) have short implementation periods; v) almost exclusively fund NGOs that directly provide services to the target population; and vi) fund several NGOs (in one case, Rio, there are over 40 recipients).

Convinced that the effectiveness of these efforts could be strengthened by increasing our understanding of the street-children problem, the IDB sponsored a workshop in Terezopolis, Brazil, in August 1995 to review current thinking among analysts and activists involved with programs for youth in Brazil. The Workshop brought together IDB staff working in the areas of Early Child Care and Development (ECCD), street-children, and other youth at risk, with over two dozen people knowledgeable about street-children.

These included principals of salient Brazilian NGOs (some financed by the IDB), Brazilian municipal government officials, officers of diverse donor agencies (including private foundations and multinationals), and distinguished authors on the topic.[3]

The material presented at the Workshop was inevitably dominated by Brazilian experience. Brazil's problems with street-children have been graver, or at least more notorious for longer, than elsewhere in the region. In response, many diverse institutions, programs and approaches have emerged over the past 20 years. Brazil's accumulated experience provides a rich empirical base for beginning to judge the relative merits of different strategies concerning street-children. Despite the limitations of generalizing from a single country, these judgments may be useful in other countries too.

Only some of the programs discussed at the Workshop or visited as part of the Workshop activities were IDB-funded. The focus of the Workshop and this note's perspective go well beyond the IDB's portfolio, and consider the effectiveness of alternative approaches to the

street-children problem more generally.[4]

1.2 Purpose of this paper

Based largely on what we learned in Terezopolis, this paper draws some lessons and proposals for IDB involvement with street-children. (At least some of these lessons and proposals should also be relevant for other international development agencies.) It is intended to provoke discussion eventually leading policy decisions within the IDB on how best to respond to the problem of street-children in our client countries. Much has been learned during the successful completion of the first cycle of projects that can be incorporated into forthcoming projects. The 8th Replenishment mandates a shift of more of IDB's resources into social development and to benefit the poor; and it is important to use these resources as effectively as possible. These factors and new thinking about the street-children problem invite modifications in present practice.

1.3 Summing it all up

The key lesson

The key lesson from the Terezopolis meeting and this paper is that the programs with greatest and most *lasting* impact on the "street-children problem" are not "street-children programs" in the usual sense. Rather, they are programs that help build up the "social" and human capital of the poorest urban communities and families. They focus broadly on all children, including those yet unborn. These programs help provide basic (but "quality") services for sanitation, health and nutrition (especially for pregnant women and children), early child care and development, pre-school, and education. They make a special effort to help boys and, even more importantly, girls stay in school and off the streets until they are ready to either pursue post-basic education or secure a decent job. These "mainstream" programs are more effective in reducing the number of street-children in the long run than programs which directly target street-children. These "remedial" or targeted programs have varying and often disappointing success in equipping children to leave the streets, and do little or nothing about the factors that impel children onto the streets.

Key recommendation for the IDB

We propose that the IDB's response to the street-children problem should *focus primarily on supporting good basic social services for the poor*. There are several reasons: the development imperative and comparative advantage of the IDB (deriving from experience and staff skills); the need (as always) to make difficult choices about the best use of scarce resources; and our assessment of the relative cost-effectiveness of various approaches. There is strong client interest in Bank assistance in ensuring that good basic social services—increasingly directed toward early childhood education and care—are available to the poor. The portfolio and pipeline of both TCs and loans are growing, and the IDB should build on this strength, taking care that these services are accessible and useful to families whose children are at risk of ending on the streets.

Preventive versus remedial responses to the street-children problem

Experience shows that while preventive strategies working through "mainstream" social services take longer to bear fruit, they are the key to eventual eradication of the street-children problem. Strategies targeted directly to children in the street tend to be expensive and ineffective in helping them to reintegrate with their families, the education system and the job market.

If the flow of children to the streets is to be stanched, alternative opportunities and incentives for the communities, families, and children at risk of becoming street-children must be provided. Many of the most cost effective preventive interventions are those that take place in early childhood, infancy, and prenatally; together with complementary actions to reduce teenage and otherwise premature or unwanted pregnancy.

An exceptionally rigorous and long study of a U.S. pre-school program (the Perry School) showed dramatic improvement in indices associated with street-children, such as school failure, crime and delinquency. Careful and conservative measurement of the program costs and benefits found it to be a hugely profitable social investment, returning 7 dollars of benefits for each dollar invested.

Other (less complete) studies tend to corroborate the effect of "good" ECCD programs on anti-social behavior during the teen years.[5] A recent World Bank report on at-risk youth in Latin America summarizes the evidence on the tradeoff between preventive and remedial interventions as follows:

"While it is generally recognized that vulnerable youth face a continuum of risks and needs at various stages of the life cycle, the scarcity of resources suggests that Governments have to direct public resources where the returns will be the highest. Experience has shown that investing early in preventive programs for children and younger adolescents is the best strategy to adopt, rather than waiting for the onset of serious problems."

What of shorter-term programs directly targeted to today's street-children?
There are two factors that beg a compromise, in which the IDB also would continue to fund programs that directly target the many children now living and working in the streets. The first is the rights and needs of street-children. Their difficult and miserable lives mock the fine ideals of the UN's Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted in 1989. Exploited, abused or abandoned children living in miserable poverty with little to look forward to deserve protection and help to a better future. The second factor is the preferences of the IDB's clients. The visibility and behavior of street-children, especially in affluent urban areas, makes them a politically vexing problem, and puts a high premium on interventions to reduce dramatically the current numbers of street-children.[6] Prenatal and ECCD programs for the poor that hold great promise of drastically and cost-effectively reducing the street-children problem, but whose impact on the number of street-children would take a decade to be felt, may find less political support than programs targeted directly to street-children, even though these do nothing to stem the flow of children to the streets in future.

Conditions under which programs targeted to street-children should be supported.
Most of Brazil's experience with street-children is in programs targeted directly to the existing stock of street-children. Based on the lessons of this experience, the opinions of the Terezopolis workshop participants, and additional research for this paper, criteria are proposed for considering programs that directly target street-children.

The leverage of free money should be used to induce the incorporation of rigorous, systematic evaluation components in projects; favor innovative proposals for helping young children at risk, from demonstrably competent NGOs and other agencies (such as decentralized public agencies or, with appropriate safeguards, even for-profit firms; and undertake ancillary activities, such as disseminating information on successful programs and approaches.

The IDB should also make a special effort to induce currently peripheral stakeholders (e.g., government agencies, employers' and professional associations, bankers, and leaders in the private sector) to take a more active role in a crusade to abolish the disgrace of street-children from our countries.

2. CONCEPTS AND COUNTS, CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES

2.1 The term "street-children" and related magnitudes of the problem

The term "street-children" (or equivalently, "Niños de la calle/Meninos da rua," "Gamines," and similar expressions) is commonly used in the

technical literature, but there is no broadly accepted concept of a "Street child". For example, sometimes the focus is on children sleeping in the streets and other visible public spaces who usually have no family links ("*of* the street" or "de rua"); sometimes on those who work in the streets but live at home ("*on* the streets" or "na rua"); and sometimes on children present in the streets at a particular time, usually distinguishing them on the basis of appearance and behavior from more fortunate children who happen also to be in the streets. Different age categories are used; for example, 4-12 versus 0-18 years of age. Sometimes being a street-child is equated with not regularly attending school, or being reported as "working" in household surveys.[7]

The absence of a commonly accepted concept of a street child has resulted in politically loaded controversies in Brazil about how to count the street-children population, and has produced competing and widely divergent estimates. A survey of published estimates reports numbers ranging from 10 thousand to 32 million for Brazil; and from 8 to 40 million for Latin America (Rosenberg).[8]

The "best" evidence indicates that the numbers of children "living in" or actually sleeping in the streets or in shelters (presumably lacking a home or choosing the street as the lesser evil) are towards the low end of the range of estimates that are bandied about. The most technically sound "count" of street-children in Brazil was in Sao Paulo in 1993 (Rosenberg). The survey counted 4,520 children meeting relatively stringent criteria aimed at identifying those deriving sole or major sustenance from street activities ("da rua") present in the streets during mid-afternoon, and 895 during the hours of 2:00 am and 5:00 am. There were also 468 staying in shelters. Direct counts for other Brazilian cities also show great variation depending on the time of day/night at which the count is taken. A count in Rio de Janeiro in 1990 yielded an unexpectedly low number: 698 children at 4:00 am. There was no simultaneous count of children in shelters, but an inventory of shelters in the Rio metropolitan area estimated their combined capacity in 1992 as 300 spaces (Mac Arthur).[9]

Although small compared to common perceptions of the size of the street-children population in Brazil, even the most conservative estimates based on actual counts are significant, even assuming no serious undercounts in these surveys.[10] Moreover, since there is considerable turnover of the population of children in the streets from day to day and over longer periods, as many children rotate between the streets, shelters, someone else's home, or even their own family, the number of children who spend at least a few days or nights in the streets over a year is likely a multiple of the count on any given day.

Perhaps despairing over the seemingly intractable discrepancies in operationally defining street-children, some commentators hold that it is idle to try to count them. Others consider the notion of street-children to be neither analytically meaningful nor useful as a policy category. According to one Terezopolis Workshop participant: "There are no street-children, but children stranded from their families, from school, and from society." We have considerable sympathy with this stance, and consider it possible to examine the problem fruitfully without committing to any one operational definition or numerical estimate. It certainly affects large enough numbers of people to deserve keen attention.

2.2 Beyond numbers: individual and social consequences of the street-children problem, or why it merits attention[11]

Considering the miserable life of these children, and the corrosive effect of the life style for themselves and other vulnerable children, the recorded incidence of the problem amply justifies our concern. There are obvious ethical and humanitarian considerations. Economic, social and political factors add to a very strong rationale for investing in street-children and those at risk of joining them.

The Convention on the Rights of the Child asserts the right of children to be provided for and protected, and to participate in the decisions that affect them. It has been ratified by an unprecedented number of countries, and informed legislation in many of them. The lives of street-children are horribly different from the fine ideals of the Convention.

Investments in human and social capital – the resources that make people productive and healthy -- reduce poverty and improve the well-being of individuals, their families and communities. A huge literature documents the income gains and other benefits of these investments.[12] And there are compelling estimates of the spillover benefits for society that estimate the very high costs to taxpayers of substance abusers and criminals (World Bank).

Moreover, when urban street-children come into contact with the bourgeoisie there are often unfortunate economic, political, and social consequences including some that are intensely damaging to the social order. Especially when they group together, street-children are often perceived as threats to property, physical integrity, or to strongly held values of other members of the community. Antisocial behavior by the street-children is not uncommon and provides a very real basis for such perceptions. Often the threatened parties have the power and inclination to respond in ways that further add to social stress and conflict. For example, there are many documented instances of serious violence, at times murderous, against the children, often followed by rancorous debate in the media and the community on how to deal with the street-children. And trends are not encouraging. From 1985 to 1992, the official number of children murdered in Brazilian streets averaged 258 annually; since 1993, the average has more than quadrupled to 1172 a year.[13]

2.3 Causes of the street-children problem

Does poverty cause the street-children problem? It is common to hear that "poverty is the cause of the street-children problem." Clearly, there is a strong association with poverty, and many children work in the streets to supplement meager family incomes. Street-children in Latin American and the Caribbean (LAC) come from backgrounds of poverty (runaways from non-poor households seem to be extremely rare and are unlikely to be regarded as street-children), but poverty is certainly not the sole or root cause. If it were, considering the extent of urban poverty in the region, the streets of most Latin American cities would be saturated with street-children, which is patently not the case. Only a small minority of households in the poorest metropolitan shantytowns account for street-children--and they are generally no poorer than their neighbors.

Important causal factors behind the street-children problem

Neglect and abuse at home. Amid the debate about causal factors impelling children onto the streets of urban LAC, there is substantial agreement that neglect and abuse play major roles. Most street-children grow up in adverse home situations, without nurturing, guidance, and support from parents or surrogate parental figures. This is especially true of those " of the streets" whose family links have been severed, and those prone to antisocial behavior. Many, if not most, of these children have endured substantial abuse: psychological and physical, including sexual abuse. Absent fathers, unemployed fathers, substance abuse, domestic violence, and related dysfunctional features are found in the homes of street-children with disproportionate frequency. Research on street-children in Rio found the quality of interaction among family members (especially between boys and their fathers) to be a key discriminant between children working in the streets but living at home ("o*n*-the-street") and children without family links ("o*f*-the-street").[14]

Unfavorable neighborhood environments. The neighborhoods from which street-children come are often plagued by drugs and related violence and constant physical insecurity, and lack basic police

services. Inadequate sewage or trash collection make conditions unsanitary. Schools can be astoundingly bad and facilities and programs to keep children constructively engaged when out of the classroom absent. There are few socio-economically successful adult role models. These factors are present in varying degrees in Latin American cities, exacerbated by rapid urbanization which has contributed to the spread of crowded and impoverished neighborhoods with high unemployment, crime and social problems. Negative factors tend to be highly interactive and mutually reinforcing, although any one could have a decisive impact on a vulnerable child.

Macroeconomic, social and political causal factors. Many of the proximate causes of children being on the streets are affected by countries' institutions, laws, governance, public policies, programs and expenditure patterns. For example, the communities from which street children come tend to have dismal health and sanitation, dire schools and poor security, which are partly the result of past and present social policies and expenditures (or lack of them) and poor management of social programs. Economic policies often contribute to surges in unemployment, contractions in household incomes and persistent urban poverty. These macro causal factors are important, and some agencies are increasingly focusing their energies at this level.

The problem is diverse and complex. The enormous diversity in the causes and circumstances of street-children, even within the same city, call for different types of interventions, which are likely to need very careful diagnostic study and design. Street-children differ in age and gender, family and community circumstances, the extent to which their ties to these and other institutions have eroded, and their consequent degree of alienation and antisocial proclivities. For example, fewer girls are visibly on the street, but the education and futures of girls are more vulnerable to teenage pregnancy, prostitution, and domestic and sexual abuse than boys. Street children generally go through a process of separation from their families and communities, with changing opportunities for intervention. And since individuals gain in complexity and behavioral diversity as they grow from infancy through adolescence, remedial interventions for older children are far more difficult to calibrate to the clientele than interventions for younger children.

3. The evolving art of coping with street children[15]

The presence of destitute children in the streets of Brazilian cities has a long history. A series of fairly distinct approaches to the problem has evolved. Generally, the changes have been progressive, as new models learned from experience and improved upon their predecessors. The models can be classified as either "confined" or "open." Confined models restrict children in facilities with minimal exposure to the outside world. In open models, if there is a spatial facility at all, the children are free to come and go as they please. Confined models dominated until the early 1990s.[16] This section highlights the most salient approaches to the problem of street-children in Brazil, especially since the creation of the Fundacao Nacional do Bem-Estar do Menor (FUNABEM) in 1964.

3.1 The Era of confined facilities

1) Care for the children...but not in my backyard: The "Charity" and "Scientific" models prior to the 1920s. Before the 20th century, the main institutional response in Brazil to street-children was to place them in "closed institutions" that provided for their basic needs (to varying degrees) within confined facilities. These were commonly linked to the Catholic Church: founded on religious ideals and charitable in nature (the "Charity model"). From the beginning of this century, a competing model emerged, which emphasized "scientific principles": it focused on health and hygiene, expanded education beyond religious topics, and shunned corporal discipline.

2) Protect society from "menores infratores," present and potential...and leave it to the Ministry of Justice. Accelerating urbanization in the early part of this century and growing numbers of neglected children overwhelmed the capacity of the Charity and Scientific institutions. This, and the associated problem of juvenile delinquency led to growing concern with the street-children problem. The institutional responses included the establishment of the Minor's Judge in 1923 and the first Legal Code of the Minor in 1927, which led to the creation in 1940 of the Servico de Assistencia ao Menor (SAM), linked to the Ministry of Justice. SAM established a system of confined facilities, mainly in Rio. A large and widely heterogeneous population of children and youth found in the streets were detained and forcibly taken to these "reformatories" for reasons ranging from "vagrancy" to homicide. These institutions developed a reputation for inhumane conditions and brutal treatment comparable to the regular adult prisons of the time. The horror stories of life inside them inspired a genre of Brazilian literature and film.

3)Protect society from "menores infratores"...but try doing it more humanely. The emergence of "Movimentismo." Soon after the takeover by the Military Junta, in 1964 SAM was replaced with FUNABEM, which espoused a more enlightened approach. In contrast with the "incarceration" objective implicit in the SAM model, FUNABEM emphasized education and professional training of abandoned and delinquent minors. It established the Politica Nacional de Bem-Estar do Menor (PNBEM) which aimed to disseminate the guiding principles of the FUNABEM model nationwide. While in its quarter century of existence FUNABEM's record of more humane treatment of its wards is far from perfect, it is considered to have been much better than SAM. However, the evidence suggests that it failed dismally to help its wards reenter mainstream society and establish functional and productive lives. The confined facilities which grouped youth with very different problems and ages, retained from the SAM model, seems in retrospect to have doomed FUNABEM's approach. Innocent orphaned or abandoned children were thrown together with hardened, sociopathic adolescents with a history of violent criminal behavior. The confined institutions effectively operated as "schools for crime", and there was routine abuse of younger by older inmates.

As evidence of the shortcomings of FUNABEM mounted, its dominance waned. A new approach favored open models, and espoused with growing militancy the proposition that children have fundamental, inalienable rights that the state must respect and enforce. Proponents work to replace legal and institutional norms deemed hurtful to destitute children by lobbying, public and political advocacy, and disseminating information about the plight of children institutionalized in reformatories, and later of street-children proper. These efforts associated with the "Rights of the child" movement are collectively labeled "Movimentismo."[17]

3.2 The Era of "Children's Rights" and "Open" Approaches

4) Protect the children from society...but don't lock them up. The Rights of the Child movement gathered steam through the 1980s in Brazil and beyond. In 1989 these efforts culminated in the unanimous approval by the UN's General Assembly of the "International Convention of the Rights of the Child". In 1990 Brazil approved a "Statute of the Child and Adolescent" which led to the replacement of FUNABEM by the Brazilian Center for Childhood and Adolescence (CBIA). CBIA was directed to: i) end the practice of confining against their will children who have not been convicted of breaking the law, i.e., to "open" the facilities previously operated by FUNABEM as “confined” institutions; and ii) to devolve the direct care of children to non-federal entities: states, municipalities, cities, and NGOs. Since 1991, large numbers of children have left FUNABEM facilities for the streets. FUNABEM is waning.

The NGOs which flowered during the 80s in

tandem with the Movimentismo remain an important response to the growing numbers of street-children. Public funding for NGOs is supplemented by other sources: the Church, non-denominational philanthropic agencies, foundations associated with private enterprise, and to lesser extent, international sources, including the IDB. The NGOs do not confine their clients to facilities against their will.[18] They are diverse in philosophy, "culture", scale, and approaches to the street-children problem.[19] Within this diversity, three main approaches can be described. Each has strengths that gained them popularity, usually undermined in time by unanticipated shortcomings that provided lessons for subsequent efforts.

a) Shelters (Abrigos). The "shelter model" emerged soon after the Estatuto. Many shelters were operated by agencies and individuals that had worked to abolish the Confining institutions of FUNABEM. Yet the Abrigos, like FUNABEM, provided a boarding school type environment for children, providing education, training, health care, food, lodging, and supervised sports and leisure activities. Indeed, some FUNABEM facilities were simply redesignated Abrigos, and put under new management of an NGO, which was supposed to follow new principles, including the preservation of family bonds, personalized treatment in small groups, coeducational activities, and participation in local community life.

The archetype comprehensive shelter is *Bosconia la Florida*, in Colombia, famed worldwide for creating a utopian ministate for street-children that included its own education and health systems, enterprises that provided jobs for the youths, and even its own monetary system. A less extreme example is the *S.O.S. Village* program in Brazil. Especially in the case of Bosconia, a major problem was that the transition into the real world at the age of graduation was fraught with trauma and failure.

Although a substantial number of shelters still operate, their initial surge is well beyond its peak. Important drawbacks include: i) high unit costs relative to programs of comparable "quality" of staff and facilities that do not entail lodging; ii) difficulty in keeping children in school or training programs long enough to make a difference; iii) rapid turnover of lodgers, who may move from shelter to shelter every few days; and iv) meager success in obtaining a good job by youths reaching the age limit for the shelter (usually 18 years).

b) If the mountain won't come to Mohammed, then Mohammed will go to the mountain. Street education. The shelters provide full in-house care to only a fraction of the growing number of street-children. And many children prefer to return to the streets after a night or a meal in a shelter.
Thus emerged a new approach: "street educators", who take food and services to children in the streets. This costs less per child served. It can serve street-children who shun shelters, and there is anecdotal evidence of talented and dedicated street educators "turning around" the lives of "unreachable"children. The approach continues to be used as an adjunct to other interventions, including shelters.

Important weaknesses have led to the decline of street education, especially as a free-standing approach. Efforts that fail to interest street-children are wasted, while at the same time, certain talented Street educators often attract mini-mobs of children who inconvenience pedestrians
and shop owners. This often leads to community and political opposition. In extreme cases, it is argued, children who would otherwise be in school will play hookey to join in the street-
children educator's fun. In any case, this approach hardly ever reduces the numbers of street-children.

c) Mainstreaming. Even when they succeed in improving children's well being by better nutrition, healthcare, and special education and training programs, center- and street-based programs face a common problem: when long-term *protégés* reach "graduating age" of 18 years or so, transition to a viable adult existence is fraught with difficulty and failure. The longer the street-children have been in special programs, and the older they are, the

greater the obstacles to a normal life. The Mainstreaming approach aims to help street-children to return to their families and regular schools, and eventually to enter the labor market. This approach is gaining ascendancy in Brazil and elsewhere in LAC, and seems more promising than earlier remedial approaches.

The mainstreaming model works with streetchildren and with the institutions from which they are alienated. It helps families, especially those that are not abusive, to provide a nurturing environment for their children. It encourages school administrators and teachers to provide a more congenial and supportive environment for children whose experiences hamper acceptance of school routines, which disadvantages them relative to other children. It prepares adolescents for the labor market, arranging effective training and employment programs, with support and cooperation from employers.

The mainstreaming concept is conceptually more appealing than other remedial approaches, and has some success stories, but it is certainly no panacea.[20] There is considerable skepticism about its potential when pitted against the enormity of the problem, at least in Brazil and in other LAC countries with severe street-children problems. The model has two major difficulties. One is its demanding resource requirements and resulting high cost. It requires many trained and dedicated personnel to work with individual children, family members, principals, teachers, and employers. Many of the families of these children are destitute, and need material support. Second, most of the families and communities are in such a state of disrepair, that there is no reasonable expectation of a viable rapprochement.[21] Trying to change behavior and improve the quality of family interaction in the abusive and dysfunctional families often associated with street-children is complicated, time consuming, frustrating, and expensive.[22]

There are equally daunting problems in reintegrating these children into the available schools and labor markets. The quality of schools that serve the poor is so miserable, and the overworked, underpaid, and demoralized staff so averse to the challenge of helping a recovering street-child reenter school, that mainstreaming efforts are unlikely to bear fruit unless the schools are improved. Some analysts have argued that the poor educational value these schools provide in exchange for the costs of attending (especially time and foregone income from working the streets) is a major factor driving children to the streets in Brazil (Paes de Barros 1994). Finally, veteran street youth are so steeped in the culture of drugs and delinquency that the prospects of a successful and lasting place in the legitimate labor market are dim.

The potential for success and the expected "cost-effectiveness" of mainstreaming interventions depend on the degree of alienation of the children. For "incipient" cases of alienation from families with episodic difficulties, such as temporary unemployment or illness, skillful efforts to stabilize the situation and fortify the child-family link can be affordable and cost-effective. The more abusive the home which the child has fled and the more accustomed to crime and drug abuse the child, the lower the expected cost-effectiveness.[23]

3.3 Preventive Approaches: helping vulnerable children stay in the Mainstream.

A priori considerations and some sparse but impressive empirical evidence support the view that only preventive approaches offer realistic hope of overcoming the street-children problem in countries where it has reached formidable levels. There are some examples of programs in Brazil that hold considerable promise of making a difference in the medium term. Although they may be the best solution, the street-children problem is not usually the central motivation for these programs. They are broadly targeted to poor households, and make no attempt to discriminate among potential participants according to their probability of producing street-children.[24] Reducing the likelihood that participating children may become street-children is at most only one of their goals, and

unlikely to be the dominant one. The architects and operators of these programs have more *positive* objectives, such as helping children be happier, healthier and better nourished, more successful students, better prepared for life, etc.

CURUMIM.

A notable example of a program aimned at preventing children from becoming street-children is CURUMIM, launched in 1991 in Minas Gerais, Brazil, geared to 6-12 year olds from the poorest urban households. It provides space, structure and professional guidance for developmental activities for children, including sports, games and other forms of creative play and occasional help with school work, during off-school hours (3 hour sessions on weekdays). CURUMIM activities take place in attractive centers with wide, open spaces and ample grounds, accommodating between 70 and, potentially, 1200 children per session, depending on which of several prototype facilities is used.

Growth has been rapid and CURUMIM seems immensely popular among all key actors. The children once actively and successfully lobbied once to keep the centers open on school holidays. Over 1991-95, about 134 centers were opened throughout the state of Minas Gerais, where close to 28,000 children aged 6-14 attend. At least one other Brazilian state, Rio de Janeiro, has been working with CURUMIM staff to establish a similar system. The model is designed for adaptive replication: CURUMIM's creators readily admit the influence of the McDonald's paradigm in their inspiration.

Costs are modest. A center accommodating 300 children (i.e., 150 children in each of two daily sessions) is approximately U.S.$300,000; (i.e., $1,000 per unit-child capacity. All but 8% of this total comprises construction of the physical infrastructure, and land purchase, so most of this installation cost can be amortized over decades. Thousands of children would then be served over the amortization period. Hence, on an annualized per child basis, the installation cost is negligible. *Operation costs* are estimated at between $450 and $840 per child per year, depending on whether overhead costs not directly borne by the program are included. Since labor costs in urban Minas Gerais are high compared to most other urban areas in Latin America, this range is considered relatively modest.

CURUMIM's palpable benefits include keeping children off the streets while in the centers, and it can be presumed to contribute to better nutrition, health, as well as psychomotor and social development among its young clients. Program officials believe that enrollment in CURUMIM results in lower drop out rates and higher school completion rates. However, preliminary results of a partial evaluation of CURUMIM fail to reveal any significant effects on school grades and standardized tests.

Thus, although more empirical evidence is needed, and some modifications to improve CURUMIM's effect on school performance (and perhaps to enhance its impact on the families of the children in the program) seem desirable, we believe that this approach has considerable potential for addressing the street-children problem in Brazil and elsewhere.

Projeto Futura. Another example of innovative work in the preventive arena is the Projeto Futura, which focuses its interventions at much earlier (3 months to 7 years) than CURUMIM. In the case of the children born into destitute households with certain high risk attributes, much irreversible damage can take place in the early years of life. Launched in 1992 in a long-standing child-care center serving low-income families in Rio, the Futura project is not a service provider; it is explicitly aimed at testing and evaluating pre-school child development interventions to reduce primary school repetition and desertion rates among poor children. It makes fairly systematic evaluations of effectiveness, including gathering baseline data on the children and on the facilities and personnel associated with the program, an experimental design to control for non-treatment

factors, through the use of control groups, and longitudinal tracking and testing of the children. Cognitive tests given after the first and second years of participation indicate significantly positive results. (Sodré Salgado Gama).

But how much cure is an ounce of prevention worth? The High Scope study

Preventive programs like CURUMIM (and there are others similar) seem to have greater promise than even the best remedial programs for achieving lasting reductions in street-children numbers. But program impact needs to be measured and documented and cost-effectiveness carefully evaluated to enable good strategic choices and program design. The only truly robust scientific methods of quantifying the impact of ECCD interventions on the behaviors and outcomes associated with street-children, entail very careful and expensive research efforts sustained over long periods, which follow and periodically interview randomized "treatment" and control groups of individuals from early childhood at least through adolescence and, ideally, well into adulthood.

A recent search of the literature on evaluations of programs for at risk children and youth in Latin America showed a glaring lacuna. Of 34 documents examined for data on program costs and benefits, 14 made no mention whatever of costs; another three mentioned costs but cited no numbers; and another two only gave estimated physical quantities of resources used. Not a single document had program cost information that would allow technically defensible estimates of unit costs, even from an accounting (in contrast to an economic or resource cost) point of view. (In fairness, the authors of three documents were cognizant of this shortcoming and explicitly mentioned their failed efforts to obtain the required cost data because program management refused to make the information available or because the record-keeping was inadequate.) (Goldmark).

One study of a U.S. program had fully satisfactory quantitative estimates of the costs and long-term impact of pre-school interventions on outcomes relevant to street-children. It is worth highlighting results from this remarkable study. (Box 1).

BOX 1.

Perry preschool project. The pre-school program for disadvantaged children in Ypsilanti, Michigan, USA, has been subject to a 25-year tracer study. The Perry program provided two years of pre-school activities along the lines espoused by Piaget beginning at age 3-4 years. School teachers led 2.5-hour sessions daily with groups of 6 children each, in a school setting on weekday mornings, and 90 minute weekly sessions in the children's homes with mother and child. The program operated 30 weeks each year. An evaluation study randomly assigned children to program and control groups, and followed those who participated in the program between 1961 and 66. The study reported on 123 children from 100 families who had been tracked to age 28.

Non-monetary "effectiveness" measures and monetary values were estimated for eight actual or potential program effects: 1) child care provided by the program; 2) elementary and secondary education performance; 3) adult education, 5) higher education; 6) employment; 7) crime and delinquency; and 8) public welfare.

Results. Selected outcome effects attributable to the program are:

Outcome variable	Pre-school	No Pre- school
California Achievement Test at age 9	172.8	145.5
California Achievement Test at age 14	122.2	94.5
Classified mentally retarded	15%	35%
Graduated from high school	67%	49%
Employed at age 19	50%	32%
Monthly earnings at age 28	$1,219	$766
Arrested by age 19	31%	51%
5 or more arrests by age 28	7%	35%
Received welfare by age 19	18%	32%
Received welfare by age 28	59%	80%
Adolescent pregnancies, per 100 females	64	117
Percent of females reporting one or more abortions	4%	28%

Economic costs and benefits. (All money values that follow are in U.S.$s of 1986.) Program social costs were $12,356 per child for the two-year sequence (about $6,341 per child per year after adjustments). Private costs to participants were nil. Measured social benefits, to age 28, were $71,000 of which the major components were: $49,000 from crime reduction; $15,000 from more and better paid employment; and $7,000 from improving school success (less repetition and less special education for participants). Corresponding private benefits were $9,000. Projected additional lifetime social benefits were $37,000, accruing mainly from reduced crime ($21,000) and greater earnings ($16,000). Actual and projected total social benefits per child are $108,000; private benefits equal $20,000. After discounting all costs and benefits at a 3% real annual rate, the resulting net present value exceeds $95,000 per child, and remains positive at real discount rates exceeding 7%. Net present value is positive both for participants and society even if the accrual of benefits is limited to those experienced to age 28 (i.e., projected benefits are excluded).

Source: Barnett 1990, 1993

In addition to the Perry school project study, there are five other longitudinal studies of the effects of early childhood programs in the U.S. on juvenile delinquency. All support the view that well designed and well run compensatory programs for children at risk reduce the incidence of anti-social behavior during adolescence. (None of these programs, including Perry school, were designed with that as an objective.) The Perry program proved to be a hugely profitable social investment, returning 7 dollars of benefits for each dollar invested.

4. **Lessons from experience: Guides for the IDB's response to the street-children problem**

The hard decisions (forced by limited resources) about which kinds of programs have the greatest impact in reducing the numbers of street-children – now and in the future – are greatly hampered by several factors. Cost and outcome data are scant. Causal links between interventions and social outcomes are complex and hard to ascertain empirically. And there are intense emotional, ideological, and political responses that raise the risk that actions become driven by humanitarian and political considerations to the exclusion of a calculus of expected social costs and benefits. This section tries to draw lessons from the review of Brazilian experience to guide decisions to make IDB actions concerning street-children as effective as possible.

4.1 **Choosing approaches**

An ounce of prevention is better than a pound of cure. Trying to rescue a veteran youth without links to family, school, or a steady job is like trying to retrieve a boat adrift in a storm. They are both expensive and uncertain responses to a problem that might have been avoided with good preventive measures--typically, at a fraction of the social cost. Two recent Brazilian programs described in Section II (CURUMIM in Minas Gerais and Projeto Futura in Rio de Janeiro) hold great promise for helping children at risk stay in school and learn the skills to succeed in the mainstream.[25] CURUMIM also demonstrates that well designed preventive programs can be scaled up quite effectively and that unit costs can be modest. Longitudinal studies in the U.S. show that good primary programs can have dramatic effects in helping disadvantaged children keep out of trouble.

The IDB should specialize in preventive programs. These include actions to improve social services in client countries, especially for the poor, which are already a central part of our mandate; as well as more targeted preventive efforts. In particular, considering the major role of domestic violence in pushing children to the street, violent households in the communities being served by the broader social programs should be singled out for special attention. Interventions would aim at helping these most vulnerable children, but since they would normally include actions to address the incidence of violence itself, other family members, especially women would also benefit.

There are two reasons for favoring preventive programs: the institution's comparative advantage, and our assessment of relative long-term cost-effectiveness. Nevertheless, the IDB should not ignore the pressing plight of street-children. The Bank can support NGOs and other agencies trying to help children already alienated from family, school, and society while eschewing direct support of their recurrent costs, as discussed below.

From time to time political and broader strategic considerations may warrant a positive response to a client's request for IDB support to a predominantly remedial program. In such cases, the operation should meet additional selection criteria, including strong elements of innovation, experimentation, and monitoring and evaluation. Such projects should always comprise meaningful preventive features as well,at a minimum, making a determined effort to seek the child's family, identify young siblings at risk, and either take appropriate action to keep them "off the streets" or refer them to appropriate agencies.

Favor mainstreaming options. When the IDB does fund projects with a significant remedial

objective, it should strongly favor Mainstreaming approaches in respect to three key institutions: family, school, and labor market.

Family. Repairing frayed child-family links is complicated and expensive, yet usually worth trying. Working with the families of veteran street-children whose own family ties may be beyond repair, may save younger (and yet unborn) siblings from the streets.

School. The task of returning street-children to school is complicated by the miserable conditions of the schools which they abandoned and to which they would be expected to return. Together with actions to help children return to school, measures are also needed to improve the schools' capacity to handle, retain, and educate disadvantaged children. This win-win strategy would improve equity and efficiency, and help all the children they serve prepare to compete for good jobs.

Labor market. Programs for adolescents often entail some form of training, most of it pitifullyinadequate. Typically, boys are given tools to hammer and saw, and girls taught to sew and embroider. Vocational training requires a much higher level of professionalism and a keen eye on labor markets. The IDB should support training components only when they are good enough to make a substantial difference in job outcomes--otherwise, it is not worth the effort.

4.2 Selective support for Agencies that work with street-children

There are many NGOs and other private and public agencies that work directly with street-children. This work is important and the needs of their clients are serious and legitimate. So although this paper advocates that the IDB focus its own efforts and resources mainly on improving "mainstream" social services for the poor and other measures to strengthen the ties that keep children off the streets, there are also several useful things the IDB can do to support the work of the agencies that target their efforts to children in and of the streets.

Look for best practice, worldwide, and disseminate it. An astounding variety of approaches and specific interventions are being tried in Brazil and elsewhere in the world in response to diverse manifestations of the street-children problem. There are enormous differences in their cost effectiveness. Systematic information on what works and doesn't is scant and not readily accessible by practitioners in the Region. The IDB should methodically assemble and update the available best practice information and actively disseminate it among those who design and manage policies and programs. The IDB ought also to add to the meager relevant knowledge through evaluative research components in IDB-funded projects (see below).

Promote development of gifted NGOs through training and cross-fertilization. By nature, NGOs are the product of good intentions, intensely dedicated staff and strong idealism. But even the NGOs richest in these qualities also need technical expertise. Moreover, success brings growth and growth brings bigger administrative and managerial challenges for which these organizations are often unprepared. By supporting training, including exchange stints of staff among the leading institutions, the IDB could substantially strengthen NGOs.

Promote Social marketing that targets families. A root cause of the street-children problem is that those in a position to make a decisive difference fail to take appropriate action. Movimentismo plays an important role in addressing this factor at a political level. However, much could be done to create awareness and motivate behavioral change within families, for example, motivating parents to follow basic rules of hygiene and nutrition for their children and to keep them in school. The IDB should help clients identify, develop, or adopt, "Social marketing" tools for this purpose as an integral part of the strategy to assist our clients with the street-children problem.

Promote institutional reform to ensure delivery of "critical minimum service packages" to children at risk. A central challenge in strategies to improve the odds for children at risk is ensuring that no critical basic need goes unmet. Failure regarding any one such need often leads to

"system-wide failure," even if other requirements are met. For example, if children fail to receive adequate health care and nutrition, the resources devoted to their education and training could be largely wasted. The Bank should shun putting resources into the provision of ad hoc services that are not part of a strategy that takes these complementarities into account.

Broaden the range of institutional allies and stakeholders. NGOs are essential in the crusade to help street-children, but other actors also need to play a major role. The IDB should try more explicitly to bring in government, trade associations, and foundations spawned by private enterprise, such as Viva and Odebrecht in Brazil. An example would be to nurture institutional arrangements involving regular schools, technical and vocational training institutions, and medical service agencies (perhaps as part of education or health projects) to better accommodate the needs of children at risk.

4.3 Choosing partners

Having said that the IDB should collaborate increasingly with a range of other actors including government, private foundations and profit seeking enterprises, this section offers principles for choosing the best partners for the occasion.

Ensure that partners have the managerial capability to contract with the Bank. There are huge numbers of organizations and individuals trying to help street-children. Not all are suitable IDB partners, even though they may be doing excellent work. Despite recent and prospective simplification, IDB bureaucratic procedures still demand a certain level of managerial and administrative capability of partner agencies. Agencies who have to divert their energy to make extraordinary efforts to deal with the IDB's relatively intricate contractual requirements may be worse off, with negative consequences for themselves, their clients and the IDB.

Choose agencies with the best track records for what you want done. The IDB (or ideally, country-based "Blue Ribbon panels") should first establish and then apply selection criteria geared to pick agencies whose experience and capabilities best match the required task. Institutional vocation is important, and it is generally a poor idea to expect even the best NGOs to do things outside their call; an even poorer idea is to ask them to do it by applying ready-made delivery models --especially rigid, cookie-cutter protocols. Absent such idea potential partners, pick the closest fit and build into the deal appropriate levels of short-run support and long-term strengthening, especially through exchanges with leading programs elsewhere.

Avoid funding "movimentismo". While Movimentismo, and its activist agencies have a valid and important role to play in combating the street-children problem, this is not a suitable arena for the IDB. The IDB is insufficiently attuned to the milieu to avoid unscrupulous or ineffectual activists and choosing only the deserving. Furthermore, evaluating the impact of funds used for political advocacy is practically impossible.

4.4. Big banks doing small operations: Using leverage and easing the fit

The IDB has been funding small agencies who work with children at risk only fairly recently. This section includes proposals to improve the effectiveness of these efforts.

Further clarify criteria and process for choosing which agencies to fund. Selecting agencies for funding should be a very transparent process based on open competition with clear rules and robust procedures to help resist special pleading, favoring insiders, and outright political pressure. The creation and empowerment of *Blue Ribbon* panels to select and oversee agencies receiving unds would greatly help. In addition, the IDB should exercise ongoing vigilance to ensure that he interest groups, spoil systems, and patronage which riddle public programs catering to the poor o not appear in such panels.

Promote donor coordination and seek partnerships. Donor coordination can help screen and select among agencies for potential IDB

funding according to established criteria. It can also help identify promising approaches in specific countries. Partnerships with leading-edge institutions also help the Bank to keep on top of best practice in the country and in the region.

Insist on sustainability. The IDB should always have a clear idea of how operations initiated or expanded with IDB-funding will remain financially viable after disbursements end. Perhaps recipient agencies could be trained in the art of fund-raising. Partnerships with agencies in a position to fund recurrent costs after IDB funding ends should be systematically explored; this includes government.

Insist on reliable cost data for IDB-funded programs. Reliable cost data should be, in our view, a standard feature of programs as a matter of good financial practice. They are absolutely essential to assessing cost-effectiveness of different approaches. We must resist pressures to waive requirements that clients maintain appropriate, and accurate, cost- and administrative records. At least some local donors in Brazil (e.g. Vita Foundation) require good costing and accounting records from their clients and report good compliance, even from small recipients. The IDB should closely examine these examples and adapt and adopt successful procedures. For participating agencies that initially lack the capability, the IDB could help arrange training, and support learning-by-doing in the course of a project.

A strong evaluative research component in these projects should be the rule. Section III recommended that evaluation research be a part of street-children projects because it is essential for cost-effective choices. There is another reason, to do with the "internal efficiency" of the IDB. Despite the modest amounts of staff and consultant time invested in their preparation, compared to other social lending projects, projects concerned with street-children are relatively expensive in staff time per dollar of funding, or per project beneficiary. And some of our recommendations entail greater use of specialized staff and consultants in project preparation. A major justification for the high cost would be the expectation of generating "research and development" knowledge useful to subsequent operations.[26]

The IDB should favor risky projects with high potential benefits, but not weak agencies. As the trustee of relatively substantial grant-funds, the IDB has important advantages over most other funding sources in being able to back high risk/high potential payoff ventures and experiments. It can afford to do so, and is strategically placed to disseminate resulting insights and breakthroughs. There is a crucial distinction between ventures in which the risk is inherent in the nature of a particular strategy being tried, and those in which the risk comes from the weak capabilities of the executing agency. We endorse the former and shun the latter. Within prudent bounds, we propose that a significant part of the grant funds available for children-oriented activities be earmarked for high risk/payoff undertakings.

It needs be recognized that working with NGOs and other small agencies, especially in this most "unbusinesslike-as-usual" sphere, is a relatively high-risk proposition. And if, as we trust, the IDB is going to continue working with NGOs concerned with children, we should be prepared for and accept an occasional crash.

Further simplify red tape for working with NGOs. The IDB developed its administrative and lending rules by working with large engineering and infrastructure projects. These rules tend to be too ponderous and complex for dealing with smaller institutions, like most NGOs working with children at risk. The IDB has made considerable progress in simplifying administrative procedures, but these could be further trimmed in line with the amounts of funds transferred and the activities involved.

ENDNOTES

[1] This paper draws heavily on a workshop held in Terezopolis, Brazil, in August 1995. In addition to the wealth of ideas and material presented at the workshop, the paper has benefited from a written contribution by Miguel Darcy de Oliveira, focusing and reflecting, on the recommendatios made at the Workshop (which he skillfully moderated) on how the IDB could improve its effectiveness in working in this area, especially in Brazil. It has also benefited from suggestions by many other analysts and practitioners in the field, especially our colleagues at the IDB. We are particularly indebted to Dino Caprirolo, Roberto Correia Lima, Claudia de Colstoun Werebe, Ana Lucia Dezolt, Emilio Garcia Mendez, Lara Goldmark, Beatriz Harretche, Jean-Michel Houde, Sarah Howden and Robert Kaplan for their valuable written comments on earlier drafts. A previous version of this paper was presented at a joint workshop with UNICEF on June 23, 1996, where we received many suggestions for improving the paper. We would like to specifically acknowledge the very valuable ideas provided by the UNICEF discussants: Marta Mauras, Emilio Garcia Mendez, and Eduardo Bustelo. The present version of the paper benefited from thoughtful editing by Joy de Beyer, who also contributed valuable ideas contained here.

Because of the controversial and oftentimes emotionally charged nature of the topic at hand, because its authors are Senior Economist and Chief, respectively of the IDB's Social Programs Division (SDS Department), and because it deals with issues of IDB policy, a strong disclaimer is in order. It is thus more than a formality to insist that at its present stage, nothing in this draft has been officially reviewed, commented, nor cleared by any level of IDB management. Moreover, while this draft incorporates many comments from colleagues in and outside the Bank, we have maintained our original positions in several areas where others expressed strong disagreement. In short, only the individual authors deserve to be associated with errors of fact or interpretation, and contrary judgments, in this "discussion paper".

[2] The three most recent TCs for Minors in especially difficult circumstances (BR/Six cities, AR/Nine provinces, and Bolivia), used between 35 (Bolivia) and 40 (Argentina) person-weeks during preparation and budgeted 12 to 14 person-weeks for the execution stage which is substantially less than typical values for a sample of recent "mainstream" social projects.

[3] The Workshop was jointly sponsored by the Social Programs Division (SOC/SDS) and Country Division 1 (SO1/OD1) of the IDB. It was organized by a team comprising Roberto Correia Lima (COF/CBR), Lara Goldmark (Consultant, SDS/SOC), Beatriz Harretche (Consultant, SDS/SOC); and Claudia de Colstoun Werebe (RE1/OD1) and Ricardo Moran (SDS/SOC), who jointly coordinated the event. Many others helped, especially Ana Lucia Dezolt (Consultant, COF/CBR) and Amelia María Noronha Pessoa de Queiroz (Executing Unit, Program of Assistance to Minors in Especially Difficult Circumstances in Rio de Janeiro), the Country Office in Brasilia and UNICEF, Brazil. We are very grateful to all who collaborated and participated in the Workshop.

The Workshop's format encouraged participants to share candidly their views and experiences--including those critical of the IDB--and to engage in a frank dialogue about the main issues surrounding street-

children. The program and list of participants are attached (Annex B and Annex C).

[4] In contrast with our purview, the Evaluation Office of IDB (EVO) has recently undertaken three mid-term evaluations of IDB-funded projects for "Children in especially difficult circumstances" (CEDC) in Brazil, Guatemala, and Peru. The draft reports provided useful material for the present note. Links between EVO's work in this area and our own work in SDS/SOC were forged early on, when EVO was planning the studies and we were planning the Terezopolis Workshop, and have remained in place to the present. Thus, one of the present authors has been a member of EVO's Advisory Group on the CEDC evaluations from the outset while the consultant responsible for the reports underlying the evaluations (Mr. Domingos Donida) attended the Terezopolis Workshop and participated in the related field visits to street-children programs.

[5] The same conclusion is reached by a recent study of out-of-school youth in Jamaica commissioned by USAID in 1995, which found that most problems that put adolescents at risk begin much earlier. The study concludes that interventions during adolescence would only help one generation of kids, and subsequent generations would emerge with similar problems unless preventive measures were applied much earlier.(Trevor Hamilton and Associates 1996)

[6] In addition to the appeal of immediacy in affecting the street-children problem, remedial interventions also have an intrinsic sentimental and political advantage over preventive action. In the words of one who should know, a former mayor of Rio, "You can photograph a kid as a 'street kid' and two months later playing volleyball in a nice shelter, but you can't do the same with a 5-year old with only the potential of becoming a street kid."

[7] Related to the issue of "street-children" is the concept of "child workers," for which the definitional and measurement problems are somewhat lessened by proximity to traditional ILO labor force concepts and derived household survey estimates. In Brazil, empirical surveys of child labor commonly use 10-14 years as the relevant group. Close to 3 million (19%) of the approximately 16 million children in the 10-14 year age group in 1990 in Brazil (12 million in urban areas) were in the labor force, either working (1.4 million) or looking for work as their main activity (Paes de Barros). Whether regarded as street-children or not, these less controversial numbers clearly show that the problem of child development in Brazil, as well as the broader problems of social and economic development, were major. In other Latin American countries, the labor force participation rate for 10-14 year olds around 1992 ranged from less than 2% in Chile to 13% in Honduras (data compiled by CEPAL, cited in Paes de Barros).

[8] Even when a single concept and definition is used, large discrepancies can result from using different methods of estimation; particularly indirect methods using data collected for other purposes versus attempts to actually count children at a particular time and place. The 10,000 number for Brazil is associated with a narrow notion of street-children entailing their "living in, or from, the streets" ("de rua") while the 32,000,000 number refers to their "presence in the streets" ("na rua"). In the numbers cited for Latin America, the lowest corresponds to "presence in the streets" and the highest to two separate estimates: one that refers to "abandoned" children and another referring to "living in..."). (Rosenberg). Those involved in street-children programs and advocacy tend to produce high estimates and to use

them to lobby for increased public support.

[9] Of 10 cities for which direct counts are available, those showing the largest totals are Fortaleza (3,421 at 8:00 am in 1987), Salvador (6,252 at 1:30 pm in 1993), and Belem (3,521 at midnight in 1993). (Rosenberg, direct communication).

[10] Undercounting children sleeping in the streets or public places is a far more likely error than the opposite, since for their own security there is a strong incentive to remain out of sight, and out of harm's way, while sleeping.

[11] For a particularly good and concise discussion of this point, see: World Bank, 1996.

[12] See, for example, Psacharopoulis, Human Capital for Better Lives, World Bank, Washington D.C..

[13] New York Times. May 1, 1996. A well publicized massacre of 8 street-children while they were sleeping in front of the Candelaria church in Rio de Janeiro took place in 1993.

[14] Cited in Mac Arthur 1993. In a study by FLASCO/UNICEF, the likelihood of the child severing family links was greatly increased if there was no father in the household, or if the father was unemployed. In another study, 76% of street-children with family ties said they had both a mother and a father, but only 44% of street-children without family ties said they had a father.

[15] This section relies heavily on Mac Arthur.

[16] Interestingly, some of the most effective proponents of the most recent approaches were also key proponents and practitioners of earlier models, including confined institutions. One such individual, Prof. Antonio Carlos Gomes da Costa, deserves special mention, for he is an architect of the modern paradigms of two contrasting models: the confined institution (FUNABEM), and the open institution (CURUMIM). At the same time, he presided over FUNABEM as its CEO, and had a role in the early stages of the CURUMIM program. Prof. Gomes da Costa's involvement with the street-children problem in Brazil (and elsewhere in the world) over the decades may be seen as an encouraging example of individual and social learning reinforcing each other and moving apace; his participation in the Terezopolis workshop was particularly rewarding to other participants.

[17] There are some interesting varieties of Movimentista NGOs. For example, some lobby on behalf of other, street-oriented NGOs, especially to try and secure greater public and other funding, or to change legislation affecting their operations. Some may also provide training and other services to the "operational" NGOs that deliver services to children. One of the most notable which has been the flagship of Movimentismo, is the Movimento Nacional de Meninos e Meninas de Rua (MNMMR). Normally, it provides no direct services to children and, with headquarters in Brasilia, is focused on lobbying federal agencies for legislation promoting children's rights and for resources for street-oriented NGOs. The MNMMR has played a key role in organizing the now annual street-children conventions held in Brasilia that began in the heyday of Movimentismo in 1990. Perhaps because of the central role of ideology and because they operate in the political arena, Movimentista NGOs have attracted considerable criticism, including the charge that

some of them are more focused on mobilizing resources for the benefit of the people running them than on delivering services to needy children.

[18] Of course there continue to be minors convicted of violent crimes in Juvenile court who are confined in detention facilities operated by public sector agencies.

[19] The more than 40 NGOs financed by the IDB's "Rio project", AT-955, provide a good sampling of such diversity. See EVO, PPR-4/96.

[20] A Brazilian NGO in Fortaleza (Antonio Cavalcanti's "Centro de Estudos da Familia") is said to be using a promising method to work with the families and communities of adolescents with problems of drugs and violence. Also, there are programs in other countries directed at family mainstreaming that report a proportion of successful outcomes. Israel has several such programs. However, even the most successful ones have a high proportion of failures and the cost per success is high.

[21] The IDB-financed "Peru" and "Rio" TC projects have so far had disappointing results in reinserting children into family, school, and labor markets. Family reinsertion efforts (especially in Rio) are hampered by the reluctance of program staff to go to the neighborhoods where these children originate for fear of their personal safety.

[22] Shelter and Street-education services are regarded by some as intermediate vehicles to instill in street-children a modicum of trust in an adult, the program worker, to make the option of mainstreaming a realistic proposition.

[23] Some of the most promising mainstreaming interventions have a strong preventive character to them. For example, one of the few breakthroughs in a long and frustrating search for cost-effective methods to break the cycle of child abuse in the family, relies on a program of periodic home visits and group sessions for women with a history of child abuse, beginning in the second trimester of pregnancy and continuing at least biweekly until the baby is at least one year old (as in the STEEP Program in Minnesota, US) or considerably longer (as in the HIPPY program in Israel). A modified version of the STEEP program is being tested in Chile, with a view to adapting it to a developing country environment, under a grant from the U.S. National Institute of Mental Health. For a description of the STEEP program, and a review of the relevant literature, see Egeland and Erickson.

[24] An arguable exception is the highly specialized programs to care for very young orphaned or abandoned children, or those who have been rescued by authorities from imminent danger of mortal harm by crazed or degenerate parents. In view of the strong association found in many studies between such early trauma and eventual life in the streets, such programs may be viewed as more directly addressing the street-children problem. Though when asked about their purpose, their architects and operators also tend to emphasize saving the children's lives and caring for them rather than preventing them from becoming street-children.

[25] A child development component of the Programa de Apoio as Reformas Sociais (PROARES) being implemented with Bank participation in Ceará also holds considerable potential.

[26] Looking at it differently, comparing plausible estimates of the number of street-children in the region, and the numbers that IDB financed activities could hope to help materially, it is clear that to have any significant impact on the problem, the Bank would have to leverage efforts through "externalities" such as finding better ways of doing things and spreading the word and practice around the region--and perhaps beyond.

Abbreviations

CBIA	Center for Childhood and Adolescence
CEDC	Children in especially difficult circumstances
CEPAL	Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
ECCD	Early Child Care and Development
EVO	Evaluation Office
FUNABEM	Fundacao Nacional do Bem-Estar do Menor
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
ILO	International Labor Organization
LAC	Latin America and the Caribbean
MNMMR	Movimento Nacional de Meninos e Meninas de Rua
NGO	Non-governmental organization
PNBEM	Politica Nacional de Bem-Estar do Menor
SAM	Servico de Assistencia ao Menor
TC	Technical Cooperation (grant funds disbursed by the IDB)
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund

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Annex A

IDB-SUPPORTED PROJECTS TO ASSIST CHILDREN IN ESPECIALLY DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES (CEDC) Disbursement Status as of June 30, 1996						
	Country/Date of Approval	**Project**	**IDB amount (US$ equivalent)**	**Disbursed (US$ equivalent)**	**% Disbursed / Approved**	**Description**
1.	**Regional*/ Dec. 1991**	**ATN/TF/3894**	**3,075,000**	**1,645,974**	**54%**	**(Central America and Panama): Promote the protection and social integration of CEDCs to improve conditions that affect development of children.**
	*** Of which Guatemala shows the following:**		**500,000**	**304,915**	**61%**	
2.	**Regional/ Nov . 1992**	**ATN/TF/4105**	**4,000,000**	**1,799,602**	**45%**	**PROANDES, Stage II: (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela): relief of extreme poverty, improving child nutrition, access to basic education and health.**
3.	**Brazil/ June 1993**	**ATN/TF/4237**	**8,000,000**	**5,576,623**	**70%**	**Attention to CEDC.**
4.	**Peru/ Oct. 1993**	**ATN/TF/4344**	**6,300,000**	**5,462,738**	**87%**	**BID/UNICEF integrated assistance for children in survival activities, day-care for pre-schoolers.**
5.	**Brazil/ June 1994**	**ATN/SF/4580**	**17,900,000**	**1,977,895**	**11%**	**Attention to CEDC.**
6.	**Argentina/ Mar. 1995**	**TC-94-01-168**	**19,720,000**	**2,522,941**	**13%**	**Attention to children in 9 provinces.**
7.	**Bolivia/ Feb. 1996**	**TC-95-03-443**	**2,650,000**	**265,000**	**10%**	**Schooling for working children.**
8.	**Paraguay/ May 1996**	**TC-95-01-489**	**8,000,000**	**0**	**0%**	**Integral attention to working children and adolescents.**

Annex B

SEMINÁRIO SOBRE O ATENDIMENTO
DE CRIANÇAS EM SITUAÇÃO DE RUA (CESR)
Terezópolis, Brasil
Agosto 15-18, 1995

Através deste seminário se espera alcançar os seguintes resultados:

(1) identificação de estratégias eficientes com relação ao atendimento de crianças em situação de rua;

(2) desenvolvimento de critérios consistentes para a identificação das agências que estão realizando um trabalho eficaz nesta área, e

(3) obtenção de recomendações a respeito do papel do Banco nesta área.

DATAS: 15-18 de agosto de 1995

LOCAL: O seminário será realizado na cidade de Teresópolis, RJ, Brasil, no Hotel e Fazenda Rosa dos Ventos.

AGENDA:

3a-feira, 15 de Agosto, 18:00 - 20:00

Chegada ao hotel; lanche.

4a-feira, 16 de Agosto, 8:30 - 18:00

A PERSPECTIVA DOS OPERADORES

Introdução. Mais do que em qualquer outra área, para trabalhar neste campo o Banco depende quase que inteiramente da existência de operadores. É importante para o Banco conhecer suas visões sobre os objetivos destes programas, o que é necessário para atingí-los, e qual seria a melhor maneira do Banco contribuir para aperfeiçoá-los.

Procedimento. Depois que todos os operadores tenham feito suas apresentações de 5 minutos, o moderador introduzirá a primeira pergunta e oferecerá a palavra por 10 minutos, no máximo, àqueles operadores que desejem respondê-la. Quando todos o tiverem feito, o moderador convidará a audiência a fazer outras perguntas e comentários.

Manhã: 8:30 - 12:30

Breve apresentação dos operadores resumindo a descrição do programa que operam, incluindo os objetivos, tipos de abordagens, os criterios e evidencia de êxitos e os custos.

Perguntas para discussão:

1 **!** a) Como se definem os objetivos do seu programa e como são medidos seus resultados

b) Quais são os 3-5 principais fatores indispensáveis para que um programa como o seu obtenha êxito? O que seria necessário para a reaplicação de sua operação em outras áreas da cidade?

Tarde: 14:00-18:00

2 **!** a) Quais são os 2-3 principais obstáculos que dificultam o alcance de seus objetivos? Se houvesse um aumento de orçamento de, digamos, 30%, para o fortalecimento da instituição, como estes seriam aplicados?

b) Além do aumento do orçamento, como o BID poderia ajudá-los a superar tais obstáculos e fortalecer a "capacidade institucional" da sua organização?

(Exemplos de aspectos institucionais são: definição de metas e como alcançá-las; sistemas de informação, orçamentos e administração; capacitação de pessoal e incentivos para motivar a realização de um bom trabalho.)

Perguntas adicionais da audiência e debate.

5a-feira, 17 de Agosto, 8:30-18:00

ESCLARECENDO O PROBLEMA, SUAS CAUSAS, E ABORDAGENS

Introdução. Um aspecto importante desta questão é a falta de consenso sobre uma definição "operacional" que conduza a estimativas amplamente aceitas do número de CESR em uma cidade ou país. Assim como a diversidade entre as CESR quanto a idade, gênero, problemas que enfrentam, etc, sugere a conveniência de adotar tipologias que facilitem a caracterização do problema e a avaliação das abordagens correspondentes.

Manhã: 8:30 - 12:30

Primeiro Painel. **Quem são as CESRs e por que se encontram nesta situação?**

- Quais são as principais tipologias de CESR e as correspondentes causas do problema das CESR? Pretende-se com esta discussão ir além da simples resposta "a pobreza é a causa." Por exemplo, encontra-se entre famílias igualmente pobres de uma mesma comunidade, onde umas "produzem" CESR e outras não. Quais seriam as outras causas e como elas se relacionam com a pobreza?

Segundo Painel. Como abordar o problema?

- Diferentes tipos de abordagens ao problema: Apresentar as escolhas no nivel de ênfase nas atividades nas ruas ou nos centros de atendimento; respeito às regras da rua ou oferecer novos códigos disciplinares às crianças; trabalhar junto à família ou criar um sistema alternativo de apoio emocional; cursos de profissionalização ou educação básica; integrar a criança à escola e serviços básicos de saúde ou manter serviços especiais para as CESR; ações assistenciais ou ações preventivas; "projetismo ou movimentismo;" outros.

- Vale a pena relacionar preferências por distintas abordagens de diferentes tipos de CESR (referir-se a discussão do Primeiro Painel sobre "tipos."

Tarde: 14:00-18:00

Terceiro Painel. O que sabemos sobre custos e beneficios de abordagens alternativas?

- O que sabemos sobre expectativas ou porcentagens de sucesso correspondentes aos principais tipos de CESR baixo abordagens alternativas? O que sabemos sobre custos relacionados aos êxitos esperados (“custo/unidade por successo esperado”)

- Viabilidade, riscos e problemas normalmente encontrados nos principais tipos de abordagens.

Annex B

Quarto Painel. Politica social sobre CESR.

- Em relação à política social, como definir e ponderar o grau de successo das políticas a favor das CESR? No Brasil, por exemplo, se está ganhando ou perdendo a luta para reducir o problema das CESR? E em outros países da região que conhecemos?

- Podem ser identificados políticas atuaias que impeçam o progresso a redução do problema? Que políticas tendem a favorecer este progresso?

Perguntas adicionais da audiência e debate

6a-feira, 18 de Agosto, 8:30-12:30

O PROGRAMA EXPERIMENTAL DO BID DE ATENÇÃO AOS MENORES EM CIRCUNSTÂNCIAS ESPECIALMENTE DIFÍCEIS E COMO MELHORÁ-LO.

Introdução. Depois de três anos em etapa experimental, chegou a hora de examinar as políticas, processos e critérios operativos desenvolvidos pelo Programa. O BID quer utilizar os escassos recursos disponíveis para este fim da melhor forma possível. Hoje, funcionários do Banco apresentarão aspectos importantes do Programa, solicitando, dos expertos aqui reunidos, idéias e recomendações de como melhorar sua eficiência.

Quinto Painel. O BID explica o Programa.

- Conceitualização
- Lineamentos gerais
- Tipologia dos projetos (ou atividades) que são financiados
- Critério de seleção das cidades
- Formas de seleção de executores e projetos
- Critérios de seleção de instituições executoras
- Critérios de seleção de projetos
- Uso dos recursos do BID e da contrapartida local
- Programas financiados
- Principais lições e principais dúvidas

Sexto Painel. Os expertos oferecem idéias e recomendações ao BID.

Além das questões que surgirem no quinto painel, indicamos a seguir, algumas questões de especial interesse para que o BID possa incrementar a eficácia de sua contribuição em reduzir o problema das CESR:

- A quais tipos de projetos ou atividades devem ser dado preferências

- Que critérios e métodos devem ser seguidos para avaliar a eficácia dos executores qualificados e priorizá-los em relação ao financiamento

- Como promover a contabilidade dos custos e benefícios entre os executores para facilitar a avaliação de sua eficácia no utilização de recursos.

Perguntas adicionais da audiência e deate.

CONCLUSÕES

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Annex C

ROSTER OF PARTICIPANTS
TEREZÓPOLIS WORKSHOP
Terezópolis, Brazil
August 15-18, 1995

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